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Hungary: Soviet Forces Out and New 
Policies In 
by Stephen R Bowers, James Madison University 
For over forty years, the political and military policies of Hungary were tied 
to those of the Soviet Union. Hungary's political revolution of the late 
eighties was accomplished in a matter of months and received world media 
attention. The revolution in military policy, a direct result of the country's 
political transformation, went more slowly and was the focus of much less 
international attention. Disengagement from the Warsaw Pact was only 
the first step. Years of Soviet training, military thinking and technology 
could not immediately be reversed. Nor could the nation's dependence on 
Soviet-made equipment be repudiated by political decree. Hungary's 
military revolution did not create a sensation but revealed much about how 
the new government will treat the problems of the post-community era. 
Throughout Eastern Europe today, military restructuring has emerged as 
one of the key issues during the transition from Marxist-Leninist regimes to 
the post-communist era. Hungary, a nation where political change 
preceded that of her neighbours, set the standard for an orderly transition 
from dictatorship to emergent democracy is now taking the lead in military 
restructuring. Prime Minister J ozsef Antall declared some months ago that 
the Warsaw Pact 'has lost its meaning under the present circumstances 
. . . Our country does not want to remain a member'. The Defence 
Minister, Lajos Fur, indicated that the 'Warsaw Pact has lost its earlier 
role' and that Hungary 'will leave its military organisation ... by the end of 
1991'.1 In fact, by 1990, Hungarian forces had already stopped taking part 
in Warsaw Pact (WTO) exercises and other WTO troops were no longer 
allowed to conduct manoeuvres on Hungarian territory. 
After establishing a new military policy, the most pressing concern of the 
new Hungarian government was to disengage from the Warsaw Pact and 
from any alliance with the Soviet Armed Forces. The stationing of Soviet 
troops in Hungary, as elsewhere in eastern Europe, was previously regulated 
through bilateral agreements with the USSR rather than under WTO 
arrangements. The first Soviet troops were stationed there in 1944 by the 
'right' of a victorious power and later agreements were concluded in 1948 
and 1957. Following the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, many Hungarians 
Dr Stephen Bowers PhD spent two years from 1982 at the US Army Institute for Military 
Assistance teaching Soviet affairs. He then became an Intelligence Analyst for the Department 
of the Navy and later Assistant Professor of Political Science at James Madison University in 
19871ecruring on Soviet and East European affairs. He has made several visits to Hungary and 
is a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Reserves. 
284 
Hungary: Soviet Forces Out and New Policies III 
felt that the USSR lost any legal grounds for their military presence in 
Hungary. Hungarian and Soviet negotiators agreed on the date - 30 June 
1991 - for the complete removal of Soviet forces from Hungarian 
terri tory. 2 
Efforts to remove Soviet troops from the barracks in Swlnok illustrate 
some of the complexities of disengagement. A Hungarian delegation 
arriving ro inspect the barracks on 14 June 1990 was turned away by Soviet 
guards. Later, the local Russian commander apologised to the Hungarian 
inspection team and allowed the group to enter only to inform them that 
the projected date for departure from Swlnok would not be met, citing 
vague 'organisational reasons'. After a public outcry about such delays, the 
USSR's Southern Army Command headquarters reaffirmed the earlier 
Swlnok date as well as the June 1991 national withdrawal deadline. To 
meet this schedule, each day saw the departure of five or six trainloads of 
Soviet personnel and equipment. 
The financial aspects of the move were amongst the most difficult to 
resolve. According to Hungarian-Soviet arrangements, the Soviet Southern 
Army Command was required to provide a list of moveable property that 
was available for purchase by Hungarian organisations. However, 
Technika Foreign Trade Enterprise, the Hungarian agency responsible for 
coordinating transfers complained that the Russians provided incomplete 
lists and that gravel, bricks, antifreeze, lubricants, containers or used cars 
promised had already gone by the time Technika arrived. Hungarian 
private citizens made direct exchanges for bottles of wine and other items in 
demand among the Soviet military community. The sale of between 
100,000 to 200,000 tons of Soviet reserve fuels caused a special problem. 
The fuel was kept in underground storage tanks at seven locations not 
linked by pipelines. As the tanks did not comply with Hungarian standards 
and lacked galvanised protection, they posed an environmental hazard. 
Sometimes tanks contained substances that diluted the quality. Conse-
quently, Shell refused to purchase the fuel while the Hungarian National 
Defence Forces indicated that they did not want it. Throughout most of 
last year, the Soviet authorities were unable to even arrange for 
negotiations with the few organisations that might have bought the fuel. 
Sale of Soviet military property was hampered by inadequate legal 
arrangements, as well as with problems of quality control. One of the most 
difficult matters was the establishment of a system whereby materials 
could be moved to central locations. Hungarian representatives saw local 
sales as more efficient; such sales cut out the need to transport bulky 
materials. An additional problem was the requirement until last January 
that sales had to be made for transferable roubles rather than the more 
readily available Hungarian forints or perhaps even barter. 
Given the Russian need for light structure residential buildings and 
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building panels as a way of providing housing in the Union, routine barter 
arrangements would have eased the disposal of Soviet military property.3 
Failure ro arrange for sufficient sales of movable Soviet property 
constituted a major threat to the timetable for withdrawal, since the 
Hungarians counted on not having to move to the USSR an estimated 260 
trainloads of materials offered for sale. Transfer of Soviet real estate was an 
equally perplexing matter, involving sale of abandoned Soviet military 
airfields in Debrecen, Kalocsa, Sarmellek, Tokol, Kiskunlachaza and 
Csakvar. Under 1990 plans, the Hungarian government had begun this year 
to accept bids from foreign interests for the purchase of the airfields. 4 
Less significant in legal or political terms, but more disturbing as a threat 
to public safety, were the Soviet weapons and ammunition left by 
departing troops. In the Somogy district, railroad workers found a mine 
that Soviet forces had neglected to load as they withdrew from the area. 
Several pieces of ammunition and other explosives were found in 
Dombovar following the evacuation of Soviet installations. In the summer 
of 1990, there were numerous reports of sales of light machine guns for 
90,000 forints each and submachine guns for as little as 3,000 forints. 
Ammunition for submachine guns was selling for one forint a round. Even 
RPG-7 armour piercing rockets were being offered by Soviet soldiers 
seeking a quick profit before their return to the USSR.S 
There were often more sophisticated instances of profiteering by 
Hungarian officers finding themselves in key positions. According to a 
report in June 1990, some field-grade officers formed limited liability 
companies using connections made during their service and supplied goods, 
including old Soviet equipment, to the Hungarian army without going 
through the normal 'open' contract system. In the view of critics, 
arrangements such as these prevented competition and gave the suppliers an 
unfair advantage in dealing with the military. The flood of Soviet 
equipment has exacerbated what many nations had already experienced as a 
routine problem in providing for the military's material needs. 6 
A final problem associated with Hungary's disengagement from the 
Warsaw Pact was the interpretation of legal provisions governing the 
Hungarian-Soviet military relationship. Under the agreement on the 
stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary, the Soviet Union was to reimburse 
the Hungarian state for damages caused by their troops and provide for the 
restoration, maintenance and renewal of buildings which they used. This 
latter point became a major dispute and was complicated by the fact that 
the Russians had constructed buildings without permission and not in 
accordance with Hungarian standards. Disposal of the property at the time 
threatened negotiations on real estate financial settlements. 
Reaction, when Hungarians offered the Soviet authorities only a 
fraction of the price demanded for a shop in the Dombovar barracks, 
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illustrated the difficulties. The departing Soviet troops demolished the 
building rather than sell at what they saw as a very low price. A similar 
incident occurred in Komarov-Esztergom, when no agreement could be 
reached on the sale of a block of Soviet apartments. Property left behind 
was often in a poor and polluted condition. Because of such environmental 
hazards, the US Martech Corporation was enlisted in May 1990 to clean 
sixty former Soviet installations plagued by severe pollution and un-
exploded ammunition stored underground. 
In June 1990, Defence Minister Lajos Fur outlined the broad framework 
for a new policy with his declaration of three basic pillars for Hungarian 
security. These are the CSCE all-European security system, regional 
cooperation with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and bilateral agreements 
with neighbouring states'? Armaments and equipment are already being 
changed to reflect the switch of the nation's military stance from an 
offensive to a defensive capability. 
Hungary's recently announced personnel policies stressed the recruit-
ment at the highest levels of individuals not associated with the country's 
old order. The dismissal of Major General Ferenc Szombathelyi in June 
1990 illustrated the policy. When questioned about Szombathelyi's forced 
retirement, in spite of the fact that there had been no complaints about his 
professional service, Defence Minister Fur observed that the Ministry of 
Defence wanted to 'symbolise the change in system'. Age has also become 
an important factor earlier this year. Officers over 55 were being pensioned. 
Of the country's 39 generals in leading posts, 15 were told that they would 
be retired due to age. s 
The Ministry of Defence, through the Defence Research Institute, has 
formulated five specific threat scenarios to meet the country's future 
military requirements. According to Colonel Tibor Koszegvari, the 
Institute's Director, the scenarios are, first, a natural or industrial disaster; 
second, the eruption of a remote armed conflict on the continent that 
threatens Hungarian interests; third, the eruption of an armed conflict or a 
civil war in a country bordering Hungary and the intrusion onto Hungarian 
territory of foreign groups looking for food, fuel or armaments; fourth, a 
direct attack on Hungary and, finally, fifth, the eruption of a civil war in 
Hungary.9 
Defence policy is based on the assumption that the smaller forces will be 
capable of dealing with these possible challenges to national security. 
Defence spokesmen now recognise that Hungarian fighter planes are 
obsolete and that, in view of the costs of modern fighter aircraft, the nation 
may be forced to rely on a much more technologically limited force. 
Given the Defence Ministry's interest in the territorial defence forces of 
Finland and Switzerland, a greater reliance on reserves seems inevitable. 
Prime Minister Antall has proposed the formation of a Central-East 
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European Union to supplement Hungary's security arrangements. In 
Antall's view, the new military or security organisation would be 
established along the pattern of the Western European Union. It would be 
wi thin the framework of NATO and would serve on an intermediate basis 
until the formation of a large institution that would bring NATO states 
together with former WTO nations such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Poland. 10 
The increasing westernisation of Hungarian military policy has been 
reflected in several developments. Probably most dramatic was the 
suggestion by the Defence Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly 
that a battalion of the Hungarian Armed Forces be sent to join the United 
Nations forces in Saudi Arabia. ll Establishment of a formal, diplomatic 
relationship with NATO through the office of the Hungarian ambassador 
in Brussels is another indication of the direction of the new government's 
military policy. Prime Minister AntaH believes that NATO will be a 
permanent feature of a new European order and that the Warsaw Pact is 
dead. 
The establishment of a military intelligence command as an independent 
military security organisation was announced in October 1990. In 
discussing his new work, Colonel Dr Karoly Gyaraki stressed that, given 
the redefinition of European security, Hungary's military security organisa-
tion would cooperate with Western intelligence services, especially in 
sharing information about international terrorism and drug traffic. The 
reported provision of two US F-16 fighter planes for the Hungarian Air 
Force was another indication of the government's wish to orient their 
military policies towards the west. Technological requirements as well as 
considerations of image have been cited by Hungary's military leadership as 
reasons for replacing the MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft upon which the air 
force is now based. 
On 22 February 1991, the Hungarian government announced that 72% 
of the Soviet soldiers stationed in Hungary and two thirds of their military 
equipment had been withdrawn. 12 This process alone, even at its 
conclusion, will not bring the final transformation of Hungarian military 
policy. It will set the stage, however, for the reorientation of the nation's 
military establishment and a restructuring of the country's military 
doctrine. This will happen only as Hungary emerges from an Eastern 
Europe dominated by the USSR into an all-European system motivated by 
a willingness to put the legacy of the Second World War finally to rest. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Nepszabadsag (Budapest) 16 June 1990, pI and June 18 1990, p3. 
2. The last Soviet troop train left Hungary on Sunday 16 June 1991. The Southern Group 
of Forces (SGF) has now ceased to exist. Two motorised rifle divisions and one armouted 
division were withdrawn: a few weeks earlier another armoured division had been pulled 
288 
HUllgary: Soviet Forces alit alld Ne/U Policies III 
out.A USSR air army has also left together with missile and engineer units; in all 50,000 
serVicemen, or 100,000 Including families, have gone. More than 500000 tons of 
military property was shipped, day and night, through the border trans-s]lipment area 
near the town of Mandok. About three trains left Hungary for the USSR every day: due 
to the smallness of the border railway junction, the troop withdrawal took 11/4 years. 
Soviet diVISiOns have been In Hungary since the autumn of 1944. 
3. Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 5 September 1990, p5. There have been occasional reports of 
barter arrangements. For example on 28 July 1990, Nepszabsag reported the delivery of a 
wooden house to the Soviet authorities in exchange for a wrecked tank. 
4. Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 22 September 1990, p11. 
5. Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 24 June 1990, pI and August 14 1990, pI. 
6. Tallozo (Budapest), 29 June 1990, ppI223-1224. 
7. Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 21 June 1990, p5. 
8. Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 21 June 1990, p5 and Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 19 February 
1991, pI. 
9. Ibid, 29 September 1990, p17. 
10. Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 3 September 1990, p2. 
11. Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 20 September 1990, p4. 
12. Budapest Domestic Service, 22 February 1991, 1100 GMT. 
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